——在《民主中國的國防政策和軍隊轉型》研討會上的發言
1990年代，我在大西洋理事會的亞洲項目做高級研究員。與華盛頓的其它智庫一樣，我們都一直關注中國著名的政治異見人士和英勇的人權活動家魏京生在中國的活動。當得知他在入獄18年後終於獲釋，我們都非常高興。
聽到這個好消息的數日後，1997年11月的一個下午，我在走回辦公室的路上，看到一名男子獨自站在康涅狄格街與K街交口拐角處。他看上去很眼熟。我意識到這正是幾天前還在中國監牢裏受苦受難的魏先生本人。能夠見到他並歡迎他來到華盛頓，讓我興奮不已。
今天，我很高興參加其基金會組織的這場讓人感興趣的會議，因為我們將討論中國軍隊在未來的民主政體下應該如何組織。但首先，就如何在現有的共產獨裁統治下最好地組織中國軍隊，回顧一下美國多年來向北京當局提供建議的努力，可能不無好處。
中國是個敵對的世界大國。它將美國視為死敵且每天都致力於削弱和威脅美國、其盟國與安保夥伴、以及美國主導之基於規則的秩序。但我們卻要談論幫助改善和強化其軍事力量？這在今天看來似乎不可思議。從一開始，我就對此感到奇怪且認為將會適得其反，但這卻正是幾十年來我們的所作所為。我們的努力取得了成功：當今之中國人民解放軍比以往任何時候都更加現代化且更有實力，它與在朝鮮和越南和美國對峙的中國軍隊相比完全不可同日而語。
我依然記得當時在大西洋理事會和其它一些智庫關於如何協助中國「專業化」其軍隊的計劃和討論。當我質疑為何這樣的努力符合美國之國家利益時，往往會得到屈指可數的幾個陳詞濫調。
首先，專家們會挑戰中國將是不可避免之對手的前提。他們主張說，你把中國當作敵人，它就會變成敵人。他們認為應該摒棄舊的冷戰思維。畢竟，終生反共的理查德•尼克松，最終也接受了將中國作為戰略夥伴甚至潛在朋友的想法。他曾與被稱為人類歷史上最臭名昭著的大屠殺者毛澤東握手，但自己手上卻沒沾上血跡。
其次，他們辯稱：即便中國當時的行徑如同對手；但歷史表明，敵人是能夠成為朋友乃至盟友的。看看我們在二戰中的敵人德國和日本是如何成為美國最緊密的戰略夥伴吧。我們要做的只是向中國表明我們無意傷害——不采取遏制政策，不阻止中國，不回到那個「屈辱的世紀」。我們只需讓它擺脫孤立重入國際社會，從而得享世界秩序的福祉；而沒有理由去進行挑戰或削弱。
尼克松本人在其1967年為《外交事務》雜誌撰寫的開創性文章中，闡明了假如他在次年當選總統，他所計劃采取的做法。他寫到：「將中國永遠拒絕在國際大家庭之外，任其獨自構想其夢幻、加強其仇恨、並且威脅其鄰邦，會帶來我們根本無法承受的代價。」
幫助中國建設其軍隊的第三個解釋是：這樣的話，此軍隊就會變得更像我們的隊伍——負責任、受文官控制、尊重人權、並且不具侵略性。
他們實現這些目標的機制稱為交往——在社會各個層面的官方與非官方持續互動。據說這樣一來，中國作為目前被共產主義肆虐的世界最古老文明之一，就會按照西方或曰普適的標準人性化和文明化。
此交往的軍方部分自然而然地被稱為軍方交往，或軍軍交往。目標是幫助提升中國軍隊的職業與組織標準，以及其文官掌控和人權實踐。其它理由還有：向中國軍隊展示美軍令人生畏的技術能力和人員素養會給解放軍留下極其深刻的印象，從而嚇阻其挑戰美國。如此就可避免沖突局勢。沒有什麽比在龐大的攻擊性航母甲板上親眼目睹飛行作業更令人震撼的了。我本人曾服役於西太平洋的航母上，因此可以證明：在大航母上觀看戰機的起飛和降落永遠不會讓人厭倦。
然而，眾所周知，現實遠沒有想象的那般美好。中國官員和解放軍人員的確對其所見所聞所學印象深刻，但即便他們曾被嚇到，此效果並不長久。恰恰相反，他們所做的是複製或竊取軍事信息，並針對所觀察到的軍事戰術和能力設計了反制措施。他們還以所學到的東西為基礎，發展了自己的軍事能力；並且同時默默地實踐鄧小平的名言：韜光養晦。
美國軍方官員出於軍軍交往的目的，敞開大門邀請中國人進來。他們簡直是毫無防人之心，而中國則利用了這個機會。二十年前，解放軍海軍沒有航母。今天，他們有三艘。這些航母經常在臺灣海峽巡邏。中國最近聲稱臺灣海峽是中國的領海，而非幾個世紀以來一直公認的國際海域。與此同時，尼克松於1971年為了討好毛澤東並作為其歷史性訪問的鋪墊，將第七艦隊從臺灣海峽撤出。自那以來，美國航母在51年裏僅僅兩次穿越臺灣海峽。
國會研究服務處曾經深入研究美中之間的軍事交往，包括經常安排的對話和交流、軍事演習、以及持續的信任培養措施。該處於2021年1月發布了其報告，指出「雙方繼續強調軍軍關系作為穩定力量的重要性，並似乎致力於在緊張局勢中持續對話。」
但該處也認定：總的來說，由於美國軍方行動的透明度要遠高於解放軍，這些互動對中國較為有利。美方認為其透明本身就是在教導中國，這為中國人民解放軍樹立了一個值得效仿的好榜樣。該報告指出，「解放軍渴望學習和了解相對更透明的美國軍隊（並且一些觀察家認為他們利用了這種透明），但不願給予回報。」中國辯稱，作為較弱的一方，他們無法更多地展示其能力，否則就會處於更大劣勢境地。
中國還抗拒就軍備控制和軍隊交戰規則等問題簽署軍事協議，辯稱此類舉動會限制其作戰選擇或危及其戰略地位。美國人基本上默認了解放軍在這些問題上的立場，並且繼續了單方面的接觸。
該美國報告指出：「近幾十年來處理軍軍關系的方式，旨在減少互不信任和溝通不暢，在共同關心的問題上進行合作，並鼓勵解放軍遵守美國倡導的規範，讓其活動和意圖更加透明。」有人相信，我們互動得越多，危險誤解或誤判的可能性就越小。
記得我在大西洋理事會時的另一件事，是當時的美國海軍太平洋司令官約瑟夫•普理赫海軍上將，在一次講話中曾向我們介紹了他的職責，包括其與解放軍海軍同行和其他中國軍方和文職官員的持續互動。按照普理赫的說法，如果哪一天危機發生，他會確切地知道該給誰打電話來避免局勢失控。
結果呢，在2001年的EP-3飛機事件中，危機的確發生了。普理赫當時任美國駐華大使，而這在很大程度上是基於他與中國人打交道的豐富經驗。隨著美中緊張局勢的加劇，普理赫拿出他從不誤事的通訊錄，開始給他擔任太平洋司令官期間所培養的每位中國官員打電話。結果是沒有一個人接聽或回復他的電話。最終，他作為美國政府的代表，不得不兩次以書面形式為該事件道歉，換取北京當局釋放美國機組人員和遭到沖撞的飛機。最後的羞辱是中方規定該飛機必須被拆解裝箱，然後由軍用運輸機運走；而那架飛機當時是能夠自己飛走的。軍軍交往在避免危機和增進理解與合作上的效用由此可見一斑。
我們從軍方交往的經驗中吸取或應該吸取的教訓是：盡管中國軍隊的效率有改善，但它依然是中共黨國的政治工具。唯有在那個政權消失或被徹底改革後，解放軍才能像正常的軍事組織那樣行事。我希望各位在接下來兩天裏的討論，能夠加速這一局面的到來。
謝謝各位。
When I was a senior fellow in the Asia program of the Atlantic Council in the 1990s, like other think tanks in Washington, we followed the activities in China of Wei Jingsheng, the noted Chinese political dissident and heroic human rights activist and we were glad to learn of his release after 18 years in prison.
One afternoon in November 1997, a few days after hearing that good news, I was walking back to my office when I saw a man standing alone at the corner of Connecticut and K Street. His face was familiar and I realized it was none other than Mr. Wei himself, who only days earlier had been languishing in a Chinese jail cell. I was thrilled to meet him and to join in welcoming him to Washington,
Today, I’m pleased to join this interesting conference that his Foundation has organized, which addresses the question of how the Chinese military should be organized under a future democratic system of government. But first, it might be useful to take a look at U.S. efforts over the years to advise Beijing on how best to organize the Chinese military under the existing Communist dictatorship.
Yes, it seems incongruous today to talk of helping to improve and strengthen the military arm of a hostile world power that sees the United States as its mortal enemy, and that devotes itself daily to undermining and threatening America, its allies and security partners, and the U.S.-led rules-based order. It seemed strange and counter-productive to me right from the beginning, but that is exactly what we did for several decades. And we succeeded in those efforts: the People’s Liberation Army today is far more modern and capable than it has ever been, a force exponentially more to be reckoned with than the Chinese military that fought the United States to a standoff in Korea and Vietnam.
I recall programs and discussions at the Atlantic Council and other think tanks at the time on how to assist China to “professionalize” its military. When I would ask how such an effort was in America’s national interest I usually got a handful of predictable answers,
First, the experts would challenge the premise that China is an inevitable adversary. Treat China as an enemy and it will become an enemy, they argued. Discard old Cold War thinking. After all, life-long anti-Communist, Richard Nixon, made peace with the idea of China as a strategic partner, maybe even a potential friend. He shook hands with Mao Zedong–who has been called the greatest mass murderer in human history–and didn’t come away with blood on his hands.
Second, the argument went, even if China was acting like an adversary then, history shows that enemies can become friends, even allies. Look at how Germany and Japan, our World War II enemies, are now among America’s closest strategic partners. We simply need to show China that we mean it no harm–no containment policy, no holding China back, no return to the “century of humiliation.” Just bring it out of isolation and into the international community so that it can enjoy the blessings of the world order and have no reason to challenge or undermine it.
As Nixon himself said in his seminal Foreign Affairs article in 1967 laying out his planned approach if he became president in the next year’s election, “We simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.”
A third rationale for helping China build its military was that it would become more like ours–responsible, subject to civilian control, respectful of human rights, and non-aggressive.
The mechanism by which these goals would be achieved was called engagement– constant interaction at all levels of society, official and unofficial. China–one of the world’s oldest civilizations but now despoiled by Communism, would thus be humanized and civilized according to Western, or universal, standards.
The military component of engagement was called, naturally enough, military-to-military engagement, or mil-mil. Its objective was to help elevate China’s professional and organizational standards, and its civilian control and human rights practices. It was also reasoned that showing China’s military the awesome technological capabilities and personnel proficiencies of the U.S. military would so impress the PLA that it would be deterred from challenging the U.S. Conflict situations would thus be avoided. Nothing is so awesome as to witness flight operations on the deck of a massive attack aircraft carrier. Having served on one in the Western Pacific, I can attest that launching off and landing on a big flattop never gets old.
But, as we know, it didn’t quite work out as planned.. Chinese officials and PLA personnel were impressed alright by what they saw, heard, and learned, but if they were intimidated, it didn’t last long. Instead, they undertook to copy or steal military information and devised counter-measures to the military tactics and capabilities they observed. They also developed their own military capabilities bulding on what they learned, while surreptitiously carrying out Deng Xiaoping’s maxim to hide your capabilities, bide your time.
U.S. military officials simply let their guard down when they opened their doors and invited the Chinese in for the sake of mil-mil engagement and China exploited the opportunity. 20 years ago, the PLA Navy had no aircraft carriers. Today, it has three. They regularly patrol the Taiwan Strait which China recently claimed as sovereign Chinese territorial waters, not international seas as they have been considered for centuries. Meanwhile, since Nixon pulled the 7th Fleet out of the Strait in 1971 to appease Mao and pave the way for his historic visit, a U.S. carrier has only transited the Taiwan Strait twice in 51 years.
The Congressional Research Service conducted an in-depth study of military engagements between the United States and China including regularly scheduled dialogues and exchanges, military exercises, and ongoing confidence-building measures. It released its report in January 2021, noting that “both sides continue to emphasize the importance of mil-mil relations as a stabilizing force, and appear committed to sustained dialogue amid tensions.”
But it also found that generally the interactions worked to China’s advantage because the U.S. military was much more transparent about its operations than the PLA was. The U.S. side believed its very transparency was teaching China by setting a good example for the PLA to emulate. The report noted, “The PLA is eager to learn from and about the relatively more transparent U.S. military (and, some observers argue, exploit this transparency), but it is reluctant to reciprocate.” China argues that since it is the weaker party it cannot afford to reveal more about its capabilities without putting itself at an even greater disadvantage.
China also resisted committing to military agreements on issues ranging from arms control to rules of engagement for military forces, arguing that doing so would constrain its operational options or jeopardize its strategic position. The Americans basically acquiesced to the PLA’s position on these matters and continued the one-sided contacts.
The U.S. report noted, “The approach to mil-mil relations in recent decades has aimed to reduce distrust and miscommunication, cooperate on issues of mutual interest, and encourage the PLA to adhere to U.S.-championed norms and become more transparent about its activities and intentions.” The more we interacted, it was believed, the less likely would be a dangerous misunderstanding or miscalculation.
I recall another episode when I was at the Atlantic Council. Admiral Joseph Preuher, the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Commander at the time, gave us a talk describing his responsibilities, including constant interactions with his PLA Navy counterparts and other Chinese military and civilian officials. As Preuher put it, if the balloon ever went up, he would know exactly whom to call to prevent the situation from getting out of hand.
Well, as it happened, in 2001 the balloon did go up in the EP-3 incident, and Preuher was now serving as U.S. ambassador to China, largely based on his extensive experience dealing with the Chinese. As U.S.-China tensions mounted, Preuher broke out his trusty rolodex and began calling every Chinese official he had cultivated as Pacific commander. Not one of his calls was answered or returned. Eventually, representing the United States, he was forced to apologize in writing, twice, for the incident before Beijing would release the American crew and the rampaged plane. The final humiliation the Chinese extracted was to require that the plane be dismantled, crated in boxes, and carried out in a military transport rather than flying out as it was capable of doing. So much for mil-to-mil engagement avoiding crises and increasing understanding and cooperation.
The lessons that were learned, or should have been learned, from the experience of military engagement is that China’s military, despite all its improved efficiencies, is still a political instrument of the Chinese Communist party-state. Only when that regime is gone or drastically reformed, will the PLA be able to act like a normal military organization. I hope the discussions you will be having over the next two days will hasten that outcome.
Thank you.
中國民主運動海外聯席會議供稿
