編者按：這份由Freedom House主導、作者 Sarah Cook執筆發表的研究報告，對中共在國內和國際媒體的滲透和公然的騷擾和恐嚇，有詳盡的描述。其資料性詳實可信，是一份珍貴的資料。由於全文較長，本刊將陸續分段轉載。這是第三部分。
此研究報告在2019年1月開始時，中共領導層似乎於國內外都處於強勢。習迎平成功修改憲法取消其總統任期的限制，該黨坐擁全球第二大經濟體，在國內建設嚴格信息控制的環境，而在國外則不斷増加能施加媒體影響力的機構。 但此後三年，該政權的合法性受到一系列前所未有以及自己造成的重擊：鎮壓香港的大規模民主抗議運動、武漢官員試圖隱瞞COVID-19的疫情、中央採取嚴厲的防疫措施、相關的經濟萎縮和管理不善，以及頻繁曝光有關當局殘酷對待新疆少數族裔的可信證據。
中國的國家媒體、外交官以及其他面向海外的參與者的任務是回應這些影響聲譽的言論、擴展北京的全球影響力、確保外國對中國投資開放和限制任何能對中共權力構成威脅的國際言論或行動。他們致力用有利的論述來宣傳有關中國、其政權以及其優先外交政策和試圖更積極邊緣化、抵毀和完全壓制任何反對中共的聲音、尖銳的政治評論或以負面方式介紹中國政府及其領導人的報導。
為達到政權的目的，中國的外交大使和國家媒體機構投入大量資源來推動特定的論述。目標受眾為外國的新聞消費者、華僑或流散社羣，以為在中國國內的評論員。中國在許多國家有一系列宣傳國家的標準信息，展示中國的經濟和科技實力、慶祝重要的紀念日或密切的雙邊關係的好處，並強調中國文化的魅力元素。 疫情期間，中國推動的主要論述為讚賞北京的醫療援助，如提供口罩、防疫設備和中國製造的疫苗。很多此類的主題以各種不同語言來傳達，並附以特定的細節來引起當地受眾的共鳴。 中國國家媒體利用眾多渠道和社交媒體賬號製作使用地區語言如斯瓦希里語（Kiswahili），僧伽羅語（Sinhala）和羅馬尼亞語（Romanian）的內容。在調查的30個國家中，與中共有關的參與者往往使用一種或以上的當地語言發布內容。
但此研究發現調查的國家自2019年起，傳遞更多有問題的中國國家媒體內容。中國的外交官和國家媒體在每個國家公開向新聞消費者散布虛假或具誤導性的內容，包括COVID-19的起源、特定疫苗的功效以及香港的民主抗爭活動。這顯然是為了誤導外國受眾和轉移批評的方向。此外，他們還合力粉飾和否認針對新疆少數族裔和宗教團體的違反人權和國際法的行為。最後，中國的國家附屬機構採用了強烈的反美或反西方信息，以冷落當地對中國相關活動的憂慮，包括那些與投資項目、不透明貸款或軍事擴張有關的活動，並將這些憂慮歸咎於「冷戰思維」或美國主導「遏制中國」的錯誤企圖。
現在部署的全方位策略遠超簡單的國家宣傳。 它們涉及故意隱瞞親北京的內容來源和審查不利的觀點。與中共有聯擊的參與者似乎旨在至少在一些國家獲得對媒體基礎建設的影響、破壞選舉的完整性和社會凝聚力，或輸出對新聞和信息控制的專制方法。
擴展專制媒體影響力的策略
中共與其代理人採取了一系列影響媒體的策略，包括鼓動的宣傳、造謠工程、審查和恐嚇、控制傳播內容的機構、培訓媒體工作者和官員、以及收編為當地華僑服務的媒體。 本報告附上的30個國家的深入研究，分析北京在這六個類別中的個別活動，說明這些影響途徑如何被世界各地與中共有關的參與者以不同的組合方式運用：
雖然各國的組合策略都有所不同，但有幾個從全球角度來看值得注意的趨勢：
- 主流媒體中支持北京的內容：與主流媒體的內容共享協議和其他合作關係是中國國家媒體接觸大量當地觀眾的最主要途徑。此舉能使他們將中國國家製作的或對北京友好的材料注入印刷品、電視、廣播和網絡媒體，從而接觸更多新聞消費者，並獲得比中國國家媒體自己可達到的更大信任。內容標籤往往沒有明確告知讀者和觀眾，資訊來源是中國國家機構。來自30個國家的130個新聞機構被發現使用北京支持的植入式內容，用以接觸到大量觀眾。 例如中國駐印度領事館在英文報紙《Hindu》刊登社論式廣告，而該報每日能接觸六百萬名讀者。 除了植入式內容，12個國家中的聯合制作安排涉及中方提供技術支援或協助外國的相關人士就有關中國或在中國的報導，以換取對成品相當程度的編輯管理。在如羅馬尼亞和肯亞的9個國家中，當地記者或評論員有因為發表親北京的文章而得到金錢補償或電子設備等禮物。多個總部設於中國的機構均與中共有密切關係，從被中共嚴格監管的國家旗艦新聞機構新華社到省政府和與中共關係密切的公司如華為，都積極推動有關的伙伴關係。自2019年，30個國家中有16個國家簽定或更新協議。
- 上升的隱藏策略：激進的活動如針對個別記者、網絡欺凌和針對不利新聞機構的網絡攻擊自2019年起有所擴展，30個調查國家中有24個國家受到不同形式的攻擊。在一半的調查國家中，中國外交官或其他政府代表就針對記者、編輯或評論員的報導進行恐嚇、騷擾或施壓等行為，有時還會要求他們撒回或刪除不利的內容。如果媒體機構、記者或評論員不遵從，中方就會直接或間接以損害雙邊關係、撤銷廣告、誹謗訴訟或其他法律後果等作為威脅，來達至要求。2021年八月，中國駐科威特大使館成功迫使《阿拉伯時報》在刊登與台灣外長的訪問後，從其網頁刪除相關內容。相關的內容被切換成大使館本身的聲明。香港當局和中國電信公司華為已加入中國官員和外交大員，在英國和法國等地方要求審查或進行法律騷擾。 在以色列，香港當局要求一家網站托管公司關閉一個支持民主的網站，並警告若拒絕要求，該公司的員工或會因香港的《國家安全法》而受被罰款或監禁。17個國家中的地方官員、媒體持有人和高級管理人員主動或應中國大使館要求打壓不利北京的新聞報導。
- 在全球社交媒體平台上的秘密行動和操縱行為：國際知名的平台如臉書（Facebook）和推特（Twitter）是中國外交官和國家媒體機構就散播內容的一個越趨重要和明確的渠道。除了擁有數千萬支持者的全球賬號外，是項研究亦在調查的30個國家中發現28個由外交人員或官方媒體管理的特定賬號。 即使其他被中國官員或媒體機構賬號多被忽視或嘲弄，與中國國際廣播電台有關的或會與當地用戶溝通的外交官員的賬號似乎比較具吸引力。 這些混雜的結果可能會導致涉及隱藏式操縱的新興策略，如購買虛假的支持賬號。 在調查的一半國家中，出現了大批散布外交官帖子的虛假賬戶大軍。有關操作在不透露與中共的關係的情況下，支付或培訓獨立的社交媒體紅人及其追隨者推廣親北京的內容，此類情況均有在台灣、美國和英國出現。 在九個國家中，至少有一次具針對性的虛假活動，利用虛假賬號於網上散布虛假信息或製造混亂。這些同類型的活動不僅反映出試圖操控有關中國侵犯人權或北京外交政策優先事項的新聞和信息，更反映出令人不安的干預目標國家內政趨勢。
北京對全球大部分地區的華語人士所消費的內容仍持有很大影響，因為中共認為主要威脅政權安全的是全球流散羣體中的潛在政治異見人士。在調查的30個國家中，有21個國家的國營或親北京媒體扮演重要的角色，特別是透過流行的社交應用程式微信，給華語人士提供塑造過的新聞內容。希望通過「官方賬號」功能向在中國境外的華語人士發布帖子的華僑新聞機構或政治人物，均會受到與中國境內賬號相同的政治審查，迫使管理員對共享的內容進行篩選。
一些潛在的重要影響途徑至今還未被中國政府廣泛利用，如購買外國新聞機構的股份和出口審查技街供外國政府使用。然而，這兩項活動確實出現在調查的樣本中，而它們在未來可能會變得更加常見。此外，與中共關係密切的中國公司已在許多國家與內容傳播相關的關鍵領域站穩陣腳，包括社交媒體和新聞聚合器（騰訊和 字節跳動）、數碼電視（四達時代）以及手機設備和電信基礎設施（小米和華為）。 雖然尚未發生以政治和社會為目的的系統性信息操縱，但在一些國家已紀錄了偶發性事件和潛力的證據。
The goals and narratives of Beijing’s influence campaign
At the beginning of this report’s coverage period in January 2019, the CCP leadership appeared to be in a strong position, both domestically and internationally. Xi Jinping had successfully rewritten the constitution to remove limits on his tenure as president, and the party was sitting atop the world’s second-largest economy, a tightly controlled information environment at home, and a growing apparatus for exerting media influence abroad. But as the next three years progressed, the regime suffered a series of unprecedented, self-inflicted blows to its legitimacy: a crackdown on large-scale prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong, the attempted cover-up of the COVID-19 outbreak by officials in Wuhan and the central government’s draconian pandemic response, related economic contraction and mismanagement, and a regular drumbeat of credible exposés regarding authorities’ brutal treatment of ethnic minority populations in Xinjiang.
China’s state media, diplomats, and other foreign-facing entities have been tasked with addressing these reputational challenges, expanding Beijing’s global influence, ensuring openness to Chinese investment, and limiting any international speech or actions that are perceived to threaten the CCP’s grip on power. Their efforts include both promotion of preferred narratives—about China, its regime, or its foreign policy priorities—and more aggressive attempts to marginalize, discredit, or entirely suppress any anti-CCP voices, incisive political commentary, or media exposés that present the Chinese government and its leaders in a negative light.
To achieve the regime’s goals, Chinese diplomats and state media outlets have invested significant resources in advancing particular narratives. The target audiences include foreign news consumers, Chinese expatriate or diaspora communities, and observers back home in China. In many countries, Chinese state propaganda includes a standard package of messages showcasing China’s economic and technological prowess, celebrating key anniversaries or the benefits of close bilateral relations, and highlighting attractive elements of Chinese culture. During the pandemic, there has been a major focus on applauding Beijing’s medical aid—such as the provision of masks, protective equipment, and Chinese-made vaccines. Many of these common themes are augmented with customized details intended to resonate with local audiences, and they are delivered in a wide range of languages. Chinese state media have leveraged numerous outlets and social media accounts that produce content in national or regional languages such as Kiswahili, Sinhala, and Romanian. In all 30 countries under study, CCP-linked actors published content in at least one major local language, and often in more than one.
But this study’s examination of state media content across the full sample of countries since 2019 also identified more problematic types of messaging. In every country, Chinese diplomats or state media outlets openly promoted falsehoods or misleading content to news consumers—on topics including the origins of COVID-19, the efficacy of certain vaccines, and prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong—in an apparent attempt to confuse foreign audiences and deflect criticism. Moreover, there was a concerted effort to whitewash and deny the human rights atrocities and violations of international law being committed against members of ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. Lastly, Chinese state-affiliated actors adopted stridently anti-American or anti-Western messaging to rebuff local concerns about Chinese state-linked activities, including those related to investment projects, opaque loans, or military expansionism, by attributing such concerns to a “Cold War mentality” or a misguided US-led attempt to “contain China.”
The full range of tactics that are now being deployed go far beyond simple propaganda messaging. They involve deliberate efforts to conceal the source of pro-Beijing content and to censor unfavorable views. In at least some countries, activities by CCP-linked actors appeared to be aimed at gaining influence over key nodes in the media infrastructure, undermining electoral integrity and social cohesion, or exporting authoritarian approaches to journalism and information control.
Expanding authoritarian media influence tactics
The CCP and its proxies engage in an array of media influence tactics, including propaganda, disinformation campaigns, censorship and intimidation, control over content-distribution infrastructure, trainings for media workers and officials, and co-optation of media serving local Chinese diaspora populations. The 30 in-depth country narratives attached to this study analyze Beijing’s activities in each of these six categories, illustrating how such avenues of influence are utilized in different combinations by varied CCP-linked actors around the world.
Although the precise mixture of tactics varies from country to country, a global perspective reveals several noteworthy trends:
- Increasing Beijing-backed content in mainstream media: Content-sharing agreements and other partnerships with mainstream media are the most significant avenue through which Chinese state media reach large local audiences. The practice allows them to inject Chinese state-produced or Beijing-friendly material into print, television, radio, and online outlets that reach more news consumers and garner greater trust than Chinese state outlets are able to achieve on their own. The labeling of the content often fails to clearly inform readers and viewers that it came from Chinese state outlets. Examples of content placements by Beijing-backed entities were found in over 130 news outlets across 30 countries, reaching massive audiences. The Chinese embassy in India, for instance, has published advertorials in the Hindu, an English-language newspaper with an estimated daily readership of six million people.3 Besides inserted content, coproduction arrangements in 12 countries involved the Chinese side providing technical support or resources to aid reporting in or on China by their foreign counterparts in exchange for a degree of editorial control over the finished product. In nine countries—such as Romania and Kenya—monetary compensation or gifts like electronic devices were also offered for the publication of pro-Beijing articles written by local journalists or commentators. Multiple China-based entities with CCP ties—ranging from flagship state news outlets like Xinhua News Agency, whose editorial lines are tightly controlled by the party, to provincial governments and companies with close CCP ties such as Huawei—are aggressively promoting such partnerships. New agreements were signed or upgraded in 16 of the 30 countries assessed since 2019.
- A rise in coercive tactics: More aggressive activities such as targeted intimidation of individual reporters, cyberbullying, and cyberattacks against disfavored news outlets have expanded since 2019, reaching 24 of the 30 countries under study in some form. In half of the countries examined, Chinese diplomats and other government representatives took actions to intimidate, harass, or pressure journalists, editors, or commentators in response to their coverage, at times issuing demands to retract or delete unfavorable content. The requests are often backed up by implicit or explicit threats of harm to bilateral relations, withdrawal of advertising, defamation suits, or other legal repercussions if the media outlet, journalist, or commentator does not comply. In August 2021, the Chinese embassy in Kuwait successfully pressured the Arab Times to delete from its website an interview with Taiwan’s foreign minister after it was published in print. The online article was replaced with a statement from the embassy itself. Hong Kong authorities and the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei have joined Chinese officials and diplomats in requesting censorship or engaging in legal harassment in countries such as France and the United Kingdom. In Israel, Hong Kong authorities asked a website-hosting company to shutter a prodemocracy website and warned that refusal could result in fines or prison time for employees under the territory’s National Security Law.In 17 countries, local officials, media owners, and top executives also intervened on their own initiative or at the Chinese embassy’s request to suppress news coverage that was disfavored by Beijing.
- Covert activities and manipulation on global social media platforms: Well-known international platforms like Facebook and Twitter are an increasingly important and visible avenue for content dissemination by Chinese diplomats and state media outlets. In addition to global accounts that have gained tens of millions of followers, this study found country-specific accounts run by a diplomat or state media outlet in 28 of the 30 countries examined. Accounts affiliated with China Radio International and diplomats who genuinely engaged with local users appeared to gain authentic traction, even as others operated by Chinese officials or media entities were largely ignored or mocked by users. These mixed results may have motivated the turn to emerging tactics involving covert manipulation, such as the purchase of fake followers. Armies of fake accounts that artificially amplify posts from diplomats were found in half of the countries assessed. Related initiatives to pay or train unaffiliated social media influencers to promote pro-Beijing content to their followers, without revealing their CCP ties, occurred in Taiwan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. In nine countries, there was at least one targeted disinformation campaign that employed networks of fake accounts to spread falsehoods or sow confusion. Several such campaigns reflected not just attempts to manipulate news and information about human rights abuses in China or Beijing’s foreign policy priorities, but also a disconcerting trend of meddling in the domestic politics of the target country.
Source:https://freedomhouse.org/report/beijing-global-media-influence/2022/authoritarian-expansion-power-democratic-resilience#Social
