(Editor’s notes)The conference “Defending Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights — 2022 International Media Symposium on China’s Democratic Future“ was held in Berlin, from September 29th to October 1st, 2022. It was hosted by Sino Euro Voices e.V. and the Federation for a Democratic China. We publish in retrospect the original conference papers and the Chinese translations at this website.
“Why Taiwan matters to Europe” is the topic I`ve been asked to discuss with you. But rather than elaborating on what most of you already know, I`d like to update my input a bit and put the focus on the question, whether the EU is up to the challenge, posed by the recent and most aggressive Chinese show of military force around Taiwan that followed the visit of Nancy Pelosi in Taipei?
My answer in brief: Rhetorically yes. But definitely not in substance. Substance means, whether and to what extent the repeatedly pledged solidarity with the island republic will be followed up by appropriate actions.
That Taiwan matters to Europe as well is an undisputed fact: In terms of values as one of the most vibrant and stable democracies in Asia and – as a not so well-known part of it – with a very vivid and active civil society. In business the island is an important economic partner for the EU – proved by the volume of trade, the large amount of Foreign Direct Investment by European companies on the island and on top of it by the fact that Taiwan is not only an indispensable supplier of chips, but its leading companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) being hotly sought-after partners for joint R & D.
And finally, the Europeans, albeit somewhat late, have become aware of the pivotal role that the island republic, sitting in the middle of the first island chain in the Western Pacific, is playing for the security in the Indo-Pacific region vis-à-vis a progressively assertive China striving for dominance in the region, including the control of vital sea lanes.
Based on that and combined with China`s escalating threats against the de-facto independent island, a new perception of Taiwan in the regional and global context, has evolved in Europe. The resulting attempts to translate this newly won perception into an upgraded policy towards Taiwan has two main drivers.
Just briefly. At the bilateral level that’s the Central European EU member states Czechia and Slovakia and as the frontrunner further north, Lithuania. At the multilateral level it`s the European Parliament. Just 2 weeks ago, the EP with overwhelming majority passed its 6t or 7th resolution on Taiwan. Apart from strongly condemning the PLA`s continued aggressive posturing around the island, all the resolutions that have been passed and directed to the EU commission and the 27 member states in recent years raise and repeat the same demands: In favor of intensifying and expanding the political dialogue as well as the economic and technological cooperation with Taiwan, supporting the country`s access to international organizations like the WHA and negotiating a bilateral investment agreement (BIA) with Taiwan. That idea, BTW, has been launched in 2015 already but was up to now never seriously followed up.
I do not want to downplay the progress that has been made. It`s visible f.e. in the soundly institutionalized consultations with the EU on matters of trade and economic cooperation and in the remarkably stepped up frequency of exchanges between European lawmakers at the national as well as the EU level and their colleagues in Taipei. But altogether the process lacks determination, is overcautious and fragmented and far away from giving the solidarity pledge the credibility that is needed.
So, what should be done?
First, for effectively adjusting and recalibrating the EU´s Taiwan policy, a coordinated approach is needed. For that the 27 member states (16 of them with de-facto embassies in Taiwan) should take a close look to what the so called One-China policy means and what not. An unbiased check would show that many or even most of the self-imposed restrictions are not justified by obligations but are rooted in political or rather economic opportunism vis a vis the PRC. The only binding obligation is to recognize that there is no other government than the one in Beijing that is rightfully representing China.
Let`s take the case of Germany: In 1997 the then Economic Minister in the Federal Government, Günter Rexroth, visited Taiwan without causing a stir. It was up to today the last visit at cabinet level. It`s not hard to guess why.
Another example: This summer the speaker of Taiwan`s national parliament, You Si-kun, visited several EU countries with France among others, but not Germany. Whereas in other major Western EU countries the ban of official contacts extends to Taiwan`s Big Five in Taiwan (President, Vicepresident, Primeminister, Foreign and Defense ministers), Germany has added it up to the Big Seven, including the speaker of the national parliament and the prosecutor general. When Taiwan`s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu last autumn visited Brussels for talks with EP lawmakers he did it in private capacity. Currently no chance for that in Germany even if an academic organization would invite Joseph Wu as a scholar, actually his profession before going into politics.
To add an interesting historical note: When West Germany and the PRC established diplomatic relations in Oct. 1972, the One-China Policy has been left out in the agreement, because China was not ready to follow the corresponding German request for supporting the reunification of Germany. Things changed only in 2007, after Beijing had strongly protested against the meeting of Chancellor Merkel with the Dalai Lama that took place in Berlin. To appease Beijing, the then Foreign minister Steinmeier in Nov. 2007 wrote a letter to his Chinese colleague Yang Jiechi, stating that the German government will always stick to the One-China Policy, with the claimed “territorial integrity of China” being out of question.
Secondly: One of the lessons the West has learned from the Russian invasion of the Ukraine is, that the war possibly might have been avoided by a timely and strong preventive deterrence aimed at discouraging Putin from invading the neighboring country. Reacting to China`s show of force following Pelosis`s visit in Taipei, the German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock in August has warned Beijing against escalating tensions with Taiwan by saying: “We do not accept when international law is broken and a powerful neighbor attacks its smaller neighbor in violation of international law – and that of course also applies to China.” A pretty tough warning, indeed. But the warning will only be credible in combination with a `big stick`. For that the EU and the US must close ranks, possibly in the framework of the G 7, and deliver the unmistakable message to Beijing, what high a price China would have to pay for any attempt to invade Taiwan. But for that kind of joint action, I`m afraid, there is still a long way to go – with success anything else than granted.
Jürgen Kahl is a journalist (DPA, NZZ). He has observed and commented on political and economic developments in China and East Asia since the early 1980s.
台灣為何對歐洲很重要
Jürgen Kahl 康友耿
「台灣為何對歐洲很重要」是大會提出要求我來談的話題。我不想重複那些各位已經知道的內容，只想稍微更新一下個人的觀點，並將重點放在歐盟是否能夠應對挑戰這個問題上。眾所週知，南希佩洛西訪問台北後，中國隨即發動了對台灣最具侵略性的軍事表演。
民主台灣是歐洲的重要夥伴
我的回答很簡短，用修辭學來回答：能夠。但這絕對不是實質性的。實質意味著，是否真的如一再承諾地會與（受到攻擊的）台灣，團結一致，並採取適當行動？而且究竟到哪一種程度呢。
台灣對歐洲也很重要，這是一個不爭的事實：就價值觀而言，它是亞洲最具活力和最穩定的民主國家之一，而且人們並不知的一個事實是，它擁有非常生動和活躍的公民社會。在商業上，台灣是歐盟重要的經濟夥伴——大的貿易量、歐洲公司在島上直接的鉅額投資、以及台灣不僅是不可或缺的芯片供應商，而且其頂尖的公司台積電（TSMC）是聯合研發的熱門合作夥伴，這一切都證明台灣的確是歐盟的重要經濟夥伴。
鑑於自信日益膨脹的中國，正在努力爭取在該地區的主導地位，包括控制重要的海上航道，歐洲人儘管覺醒有點晚，但也已經意識到台灣這個位於西太平洋第一島鏈中間的島嶼共和國，正在為印太地區的安全發揮關鍵作用。
歐洲重新認識台灣，政治上的支持卻是碎片化的
如上述所言，再加上中國對事實上獨立的台灣島不斷升級的威脅，使得歐洲已經形成區域性和全球範圍內對台灣的重新認識。將這種新獲得的觀念轉化為對台政策的重視度提升，其實有兩個主要驅動力。
其一，從雙邊層面來看，歐盟裡中歐成員國捷克和斯洛伐克以及更北面的立陶宛是領跑者。其二，從多邊層面來看，動力來自歐洲議會。就在兩週前，歐洲議會以壓倒性多數通過了關於台灣的第 6 或第 7 項決議。除了強烈譴責解放軍繼續對台島咄咄逼人的姿態外，近年來通過並針對歐盟委員會和 27 個成員國的所有決議，都提出並重複了同樣的要求：與台灣進行政治對話以及經濟和技術合作，支持該國加入世界衛生大會等國際組織，並與台灣談判雙邊投資協議（BIA）。這個想法其實已經在 2015 年推出，但到目前為止從未認真跟進。
我不想淡化已經取得的進展。可以看到台灣與歐盟就貿易和經濟合作問題，進行了穩步而制度化的磋商。歐洲立法者在本國和歐盟層面，與台北同行之間的交流頻率顯著增加了。但這些過程是缺乏決心，過於謹慎並且是碎片化的，它遠遠沒有給予團結承諾所需的可信度。
那麼，應該怎麼做呢？
歐洲國家在「一個中國政策」上自我設限
首先，為了有效調整和修正歐盟對台政策，需要各國協調一致。為此，27 個成員國（其中 16 個在台灣設有事實上的大使館）應該仔細研究所謂的一個中國政策的真正含義。一項公正的檢視將表明，許多、甚至大多數國家的自我設限，都是不合理，沒有法理依據的，這是出於對中國的政治或更是經濟機會主義。唯一具有約束力的義務是，承認除了北京政府之外，沒有其他政府可以在法理上代表中國。
以德國為例：1997年，時任聯邦政府經濟部長根特·累克斯洛特Günter Rexroth訪台，當時並未引起轟動。直到今天為止，這是內閣級別最高的政治家的訪問，以後再也沒有了。不難猜出原因在哪兒。
另一個例子：今年夏天，台灣立法院長游錫堃訪問了幾個歐盟國家，其中包括法國，但沒有訪問德國。在其他主要的西歐國家，官方接觸的禁令延伸到台灣的五名政要（總統、副總統、行政院長、外交部長和國防部長），而德國則另加兩名成為七名，包括立法院長和檢察長。去年秋天，台灣外長吳釗燮以私人身分訪問布魯塞爾與歐洲議會議員會談。目前，在德國即使有學術機構邀請以前是學者的吳釗燮過來訪問，他都不能進入德國。
在這裡補充一個有趣的歷史段子：1972年10月西德和中華人民共和國建交時，協議中沒有提到一個中國政策，因為中國當時還沒有準備好接受德國相應的（兩德）統一的要求。直到 2007 年，北京強烈抗議默克爾總理與達賴喇嘛在柏林會晤之後，情況才發生了變化。為安撫北京，時任外長施泰因邁爾於2007年11月致函中國同事楊潔篪，稱德國政府將始終堅持一個中國政策，「中國領土完整」是不在話下的。
俄國侵烏敲響了警鐘
再有，西方從俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭中吸取的教訓之一是：通過及時和強有力的預防性威懾，阻止普京入侵鄰國，若這樣做，本可以避免戰爭。 針對佩洛西斯訪問台北後，中國加強對台武力威懾，德國外長安娜萊娜·貝爾博克於8月間警告北京，她說：「我們不接受強國襲擊小鄰國的違反國際法的做法——這自然也適用於中國。」這是一個非常嚴厲的警告。但警告只有與「大棒」結合，才會令人信服。為此，歐盟和美國必須緊密聯繫，可以在七國集團（7G）的框架內，向北京傳遞明確無誤的信息，中國將為任何入侵台灣的企圖付出多麼高昂的代價。然而，要實行這種聯合行動，恐怕還有很長的路要走——成功並不是理所當然的。
（譯者 廖天琪，中文版的小標題為譯者所加）
作者 Jürgen Kahl 康友耿曾任德新社駐北京記者，現為新蘇黎世報特約記者。自上世紀八十年代就開始記者生涯，為德文媒體進行有關中國政經和社會問題的分析報導。
康友耿（Jürgen Kahl）在柏林「自由民主人權的保衛戰——2022年中國民主化國際媒體研討會」上的演講：
