歐洲議員聯署要求將華為、中興定為「高風險」供應商

譯者按語：華為5G一直是中國政府志在必得的一招棋，它不僅是可以獲得壟斷性暴利的最新通信技術，也能憑藉它來統領世界資訊，掌握全球各國政府民間，事無巨細的資訊和情報。西方工業國家對中國的5G始終抱有懷疑的態度，華為受制於中國法律，必須臣服於政府的指令，這就對他國的國家安全構成威脅。如今美國、英國、澳大利亞、日本都禁止華為參與本國5G網絡的建設，新近比利時也加入此行列。歐盟一些國家都認識到華為和中興會對歐洲網路安全造成傷害。以歐洲議會對華關係代表團負責人萊因哈德·比蒂科夫Reinhard Bütikofer為首的40 多名歐洲議會議員，於10月14日發信給歐盟電信部長及高層官員一封聯署信，其中指出歐中通信公司在雙方的市場准入方面不公平、不對等。歐盟甚至以納稅人的錢來補貼中國公司。華為、中興這些公司是「依法」接受中國政府指令的，會利用網絡來控制本國人民，並且對西方政府、公司和民眾進行間諜活動，他們屬於「高風險」的供應商，為保護歐洲5G的應用安全，歐盟應當對此警惕，並進行評估、定位。

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現將此信譯為中文，以饗讀者。該信原文附於後。

致歐盟電信和貿易部長以及歐洲委員蒂裡•佈雷頓、瑪格特•韋斯塔格和瓦爾迪斯•多姆布羅夫斯基斯的信函（2020年10月14日17:54發佈）

我們是五個不同政治團體的歐洲議會議員，我們一致擔憂歐洲的5G安全，以及歐洲與中國之間，5G供應商的不公平競爭。面對將於10月15日舉行的非正式TTE委員會（譯者按Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council運輸、電信和能源委員會），我們寫這封信給您，敦促您對提出的問題採取行動。

我們從COVID-19危機中認識到，在關鍵領域保持知識、能力和一定程度的獨立性，包括醫療／製藥、食品供應和公用事業，即能源、水和通訊基礎設施，對於我們的生存是不可或缺的。

在連通性（connectivity）方面，通過COVID-19的經驗，我們也瞭解到，在處理應對危機，以及保持經濟和基本服務持續運行方面，固定和移動的連通性是多麼地重要。

早在危機爆發前，歐洲委員會就已經採取了許多舉措來維護我們的安全與主權，而今天證明這些舉措比以往任何時候都更加重要。這些措施包括革新的、以數字化和互聯爲核心的工業戰略；為互聯、網絡安全和人工智慧提供更多資金的提案；監控投資（風險）的機制，以避免有害的外國來接手歐盟的關鍵企業；促進互惠的貿易政策舉措；還有更具體的：對5G安全的風險性，進行全面的評估，同時設計舒緩困局的應變方案。

5G是歐洲數據化主權的核心部分，5G作為歐洲的關鍵基礎設施，歐盟5G安全倡議把維護5G的安全作為至高的目標，這是十分正確的。根據這一倡議，我們必須在技術上，有可靠、並且安全的方案，來確保5G的安全，網絡的敏感部分，要排除採用那些屬於「高風險」一類的供應商，在中期和長期的時間段內，維護歐洲的（高科技）知識，避免過度依賴或依靠那些「高風險」供應商。

全球可供考慮的5G供應商有歐洲的愛立信和諾基亞，以及中國的華為和中興。與所有中國公司一樣，根據中國法律，後者須配合中國的非民主的專制政權。這包括使用網絡控制自己的人民並收集西方政府、公司和民眾的情報。因此，毫無疑問，華為和中興是「高風險」供應商，它們在歐洲5G網絡中的技術將構成安全威脅。

在5G供應商的市場准入方面，歐盟與中國之間也全然缺乏互惠。儘管歐盟對中國的供應商開放市場，但中國對歐洲供應商卻幾乎完全關閉了他們的市場，這跟中國政府做出了的承諾剛好相反。2020年上半年，首次大規模的5G招標，涵蓋了中國數十萬個移動基站的銷售和部署，中國供應商所佔的市場份額已接近90％。

除了享受獨佔國內巨大市場的好處外，中國的供應商還獲得數十億歐元的公共補貼，根據歐盟的國家援助規定，歐洲本身的供應商卻無法獲得這些補貼。這些優勢幫助華為發展成龐大的全球性企業，它不公平地把競爭對手在價格上比下去。

基於歐洲議會2019年3月12日，關於中國技術提升所造成的安全威脅之決議，以及歐洲理事會2020年10月1-2日的決議，我們認為在COVID-19大流行的背景下，以下行動已經變得更加緊迫：

歐洲議會議員，於10月14日發信給歐盟電信部長及高層官員一封聯署信，指出應將華為、中興定為「高風險」供應商。圖／擷自https://reinhardbuetikofer.eu/網站，DW影片，民報合成

第一步，我們敦促歐洲委員會和歐盟成員國加強實施5G安全緩解措施；對「高風險」供應商進行聯合評估和分類；掃描所有國家和歐盟的資金，資助的項目以及EIB(歐洲投資銀行)貸款等，以確保根據5G工具箱（譯者按：5G工具箱 toolbox是歐洲委員會於今年一月份所建立的一個保護5G安全的設施，可以模擬、分析和測試5G通信系統）「支援行動10」的目標，歐洲資金，即納稅人的錢，不會用於支付「高風險」電信設備供應商所提供的技術。在歐盟支出下一個MFF（譯者按：Multiannual financial framework多年期財務框架）和回收基金時，也應該嚴守此規則。

第二，還有更多同步的行動，其中包括迅速批准由歐洲委員會提議，並得到歐洲議會支持的《國際採購規則》。按照該規則，對於那些限制歐洲公司進入本國採購市場的第三國，歐洲的公共採購市場也應該對他們關閉。

第三，我們也強烈支持委員會的承諾，即提出一項類似的準則，對那些獲得本國（政府）實質性補貼的第三國公司，應限制他們進入（歐洲）單一市場的機會，他們不顧公平競爭、佔歐洲同行的便宜，藉此佔據了全球的市場。歐盟委員會關於外國補貼的白皮書是一個很好的起點，應當將補貼的定義擴大，引入更嚴格的透明度，制裁違規行為，並且我們假定在特殊案例中，存在著變態的競爭。展望未來，我們敦促歐盟委員會探索並訂出類似的新規則，以促進互惠和應對不公平貿易做法，例如，中國強制許多在華的歐洲企業進行技術轉讓。

布魯塞爾，2020年10月14日

以下40多位議員的名字，請見所附原文

原文如下

Letter to EU telecom and trade ministers and to European Commissioners Thierry Breton, Margrethe Vestager and Valdis Dombrovskis

Veröffentlicht am 14. Oktober 2020 um 17:54 Uhr.

We, the undersigned Members of the European Parliament from five different political groups, share a common concern regarding 5G security in Europe and unfair competition between European and Chinese 5G vendors. Therefore, we send this letter to you in preparation of the upcoming informal TTE Council on 15 October, urging you to take action on the points raised.

We have learnt from the COVID-19 crisis that maintaining know-how, capacity and some level of independence in critical sectors, including medical/pharmaceutical, food supplies, and utilities, i.e. energy, water and communications infrastructure is indispensable for our survival.

In the area of connectivity, COVID-19 has demonstrated how vital fixed and mobile connectivity is to help fight the crisis and to keep the economy and essential services running to the extent possible.

The European Commission has, already pre-crisis, launched a number of initiatives to preserve our security and sovereignty, which today prove to be more relevant than ever before. These include a renewed industrial strategy with digitization and connectivity at its heart, increased funding proposals for connectivity, cyber security and AI, the investment screening framework to avoid harmful foreign take-overs of critical EU businesses, trade policy initiatives promoting reciprocity, and more concretely, the 5G security joint risk assessment and toolbox of mitigating measures.

5G is a central element in Europe’s digital sovereignty and the EU 5G security initiative rightly has the aim of safeguarding the security of 5G as a critical infrastructure for Europe. In line with this initiative, 5G security needs to be promoted by ensuring technically sound security solutions, excluding vendors falling into the ‘high-risk’ category from sensitive parts of the networks and, in the medium- and longer term, maintaining European know-how and capabilities in order to avoid overreliance or dependency on ´high-risk´ vendors.

The most relevant 5G vendors globally are the European Ericsson and Nokia, and the Chinese Huawei and ZTE. As all Chinese companies, the latter are obliged under Chinese law to comply with China’s undemocratic authoritarian regime. This includes using networks to control its own population and to spy Western governments, companies and citizens. There is therefore no question that Huawei and ZTE are ‘high-risk’ vendors, whose technology in Europe’s 5G networks would constitute a security threat.

There is also a blatant lack of reciprocity between the EU and China in the market access of 5G vendors. While EU’s market is open for China’s vendors, China has almost completely closed its market for European vendors, despite China’s promises to the contrary. In the first half of 2020 the first extensive 5G tenders covering the sales and deployment of hundreds of thousands of mobile base stations across China, Chinese vendors have been allocated a market share reaching close to 90 percent.

In addition to enjoying the benefits of a vast and increasingly exclusive home market, China’s vendors have benefited from billions of euros of public subsidies that are not available for European vendors under EU’s State aid rules. These advantages have helped Huawei in particular grow into a huge global enterprise that can unfairly price-out its competitors.

Building on the European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2019 on security threats connected with the rising Chinese technological presence, and in support of the European Council conclusions of 1-2 October 2020, we see that the following actions have become even more urgent in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic:

As a first step, we urge the European Commission and the EU Member States to intensify the implementation of the 5G security mitigating measures; to carry out a joint assessment and categorization of ‘high-risk’ vendors; to scan all national and EU funds, funded projects, and EIB loans etc, in order to ensure that according to the aim of ‘Supporting Action 10’ of the 5G Toolbox, no European funding, i.e. taxpayer’s money, will cover the use of technology from ‘high-risk’ telecom equipment vendors. This principle should also strictly apply to EU spending in the context of the next MFF and the recovery fund. Second, more horizontal actions should include a swift approval of the International Procurement Instrument as proposed by the European Commission and supported by the European Parliament. With this instrument, the European public procurement market can be closed to companies of those third countries that restrict European companies’ access to their own procurement markets. Third, we also strongly support the Commission’s commitment to propose a similar instrument to reduce the access to the single market of companies from third countries that have received substantial state support from their home states, especially if this allows them to dominate the global market at the expense of fair competition, and at the expense of European players. A good starting point is the Commission’s White Paper on foreign subsidies, which should be reinforced by broadening the scope of what is a subsidy, introducing stronger transparency requirements and sanctions for non-compliance, and introducing the presumption that competition has been distorted in specific cases. Going forward, we urge the Commission to explore options for similar new instruments to promote reciprocity and to tackle unfair trade practices, for instance, the Chinese practice of forced technology transfers, to which many European businesses operating in China are subject to.

Brussels, 14 October 2020

Petras Auštrevičius（Renew, Lithuania）

Andrus Ansip (Renew, Estonia)

Erik Bergkvist (S&D, Sweden)

Damian Boeselager (Greens/EFA, Germany)

Geert Bourgeois (ECR, Belgium)

Reinhard Bütikofer (Greens/ EFA, Germany)

Daniel Caspary (EPP, Germany)

Jakop Dalunde (Greens/EFA Sweden)

Giuseppe Ferrandino (S&D, Italy)

Daniel Freund (Greens/EFA, Germany)

Helmut Geuking (ECR, Germany)