我為本文擬定的標題——「台灣還能獲救嗎？」——並非一個新問題。事實上，自中華民國（ROC）政府遷台以來，這疑問的陰影便始終籠罩著其歷史進程。尤為痛苦的時刻出現在1971年，當時這個島嶼政權失去了聯合國席位，取而代之的是中華人民共和國（PRC）。隨後，各國紛紛轉而承認由共產黨統治的中華人民共和國，並撤銷了對中華民國的承認；這一趨勢在1979年達到頂峰，當時台灣最堅定的盟友——美國——正式將外交關係從台北轉向北京，並於一年後廢除了1954年簽署的《共同防禦條約》。
在當前地緣政治格局不斷變遷的背景下，台灣正面臨嚴峻危機，這使得「台灣還能獲救嗎」以及「還能支撐多久」這些問題變得空前緊迫。我所指的是兩個因素之間充滿變數且可能具有決定性意義的相互作用：其一，關於美國現任及未來政府是否有意願、有能力信守支持並防衛台灣的承諾，其不確定性日益增加；其二，台灣的社會輿論走向——島內那種顯而易見的不安全感將如何影響高度極化的國內政治，又將如何左右選民在即將到來的選舉（尤其是2028年的總統與議會選舉）中的意向：是選擇堅定而有力的決心，去抵禦北京旨在迫使台灣屈服的持續施壓與恐嚇？還是落入國民黨新任主席鄭麗文所鼓吹的「綏靖陷阱」？
關於北京、台北與華盛頓這段「三角關係」中不斷變化的權力格局，我們該如何評論？這對身為民主高科技強權的台灣的未來又意味著什麼？在此僅作簡要評估，先從美國談起：
要有效保護一個國家免受外來侵略，需要兩個要素：堅定的政治意願，以及將意願付諸行動的能力或實力。在美國廢除雙邊共同防禦條約之後，指導其對台政策的跨黨派政治意願主要建立在兩項重大決策之上：一是國會於1979年通過並具有法律約束力的《與台灣關係法》（TRA），二是1982年宣布的「六項保證」。整體而言，這是一項相當堅定的承諾——儘管《與台灣關係法》中的相關條款對於一旦爆發戰爭美軍是否會直接介入防衛台灣並未明確表態（即所謂的「戰略模糊」）。然而，唐納德·川普（Donald Trump）打破了這一慣例，成為首位削弱這些長期承諾的總統；他將台灣問題視為北京與華盛頓之間某種可供交易的籌碼。在此，我僅列舉他在與習近平會晤期間最令人不安的兩個「突出表現」：
1. 「六項保證」之一明確指出：「美國並未同意就對台軍售問題與中華人民共和國進行磋商。」然而，根據川普在峰會後向媒體透露的情況，他實際上與習近平「非常詳細地」討論了這一議題；隨後，他決定無限期擱置那項價值約140億美元、已談妥的對台軍售案的最終批准。
2. 川普向習近平示好的另一個例子，是他警告台灣地區領導人賴清德不要宣布台灣「獨立」。這一表態幾乎將台海及其周邊局勢升級的危機歸咎於賴清德及其所在的民進黨。此外，川普在接受採訪時還表示：“我並不希望看到有人搞‘獨立’，畢竟，我們總不能為了打仗而遠赴9500英里之外吧。”
即便美國有強烈的政治意願去應對由中國挑起的戰爭，其結果也充滿變數，且無論如何都將付出極其高昂的代價。回想起1995至1996年的台海危機期間，當解放軍透過在台灣週邊進行一系列飛彈試射對台施加威脅時，美國曾派遣兩個航母戰鬥群進入台海，以此展示其軍事優勢。然而30年後的今天，隨著中美在西太平洋及更廣大區域的軍事力量對比逐漸趨於均勢，美軍航空母艦甚至可能根本無法抵達該海域。
《經濟學人》近期發表的一篇文章得出了一項帶有保留意見的結論：儘管美國在經濟、軍事和技術領域仍是全球最強大的國家，但其「主導地位似乎正在受到侵蝕」。這一趨勢同樣體現在其外交觸角與影響力的急劇萎縮。台灣問題便是一個明顯的例證：越來越多的「全球南方」國家轉而支持北京的主張──即所謂的「一個中國原則」。根據2025年初的獨立統計，當時已有約70個國家承認中國對台灣擁有主權，並認可中華人民共和國政府有權為實現統一採取一切手段，而未限定這些手段必須是和平的。
下一站台灣——一個嚴重分裂的社會
去年夏天，台灣地區領導人賴清德（自2024年起，他是民進黨籍的第二任領導人）在島內各地巡迴演講，闡述其「團結國家十場談話」的主張。此舉旨在動員公眾支持其核心政策方針：堅決駁斥北京的主權主張，捍衛民主與社會凝聚力，並透過大幅提升國防現代化水準來加強台灣的安全。面對關乎島內自決權、政治體制存續及生活方式延續的生存威脅，人們本有理由預期，賴清德傳達的核心訊息應基於某種共同綱領，甚至是包括反對黨在內的各方共識。然而，現實情況卻截然相反。雙方非但沒有團結一致，反而圍繞著兩個主要爭議點陷入了可能導致兩敗俱傷的權力博弈。其一是關於體制架構的爭論：主要反對黨國民黨（KMT）及其規模較小的盟友民眾黨（TPP）試圖削弱行政部門的特權，轉而擴大立法機構——「立法院」——的權力；在這兩個黨派聯手下，它們在立法院擁有微弱多數（僅領先9席）的優勢。儘管優勢微弱，但這足以持續阻撓或削減政府的預算方案，特別是針對關鍵國防項目的開支。
更嚴重損害公眾信任、且令台灣的外國友人及合作夥伴頗感惱火的，是台灣在應對中國大陸問題上缺乏共識；自鄭麗文（Cheng Li-wen）擔任國民黨主席以來，這種分歧愈發加劇。今年4月，她在北京與習近平握手，這一幕被精心策劃並高調呈現，旨在彰顯雙方為實現建設性對話、善意與穩定而達成的共識——簡而言之，即中方慣常所稱的「雙贏」局面。若想進一步了解鄭麗文的理念，建議您閱讀她今年3月初在《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）雜誌上發表的特約文章，該文副標題為「兩岸和平需要同時與北京及華盛頓合作」。在我看來，這不過是一廂情願的想法；例如，文章假設只要台灣回歸馬英九（國民黨籍）時期那次（最終失敗的）和解嘗試所依據的模式——即所謂的「九二共識」（承認「一個中國」原則，但各自對「一個中國」的內涵就能保留不同方面的要求。在不久的將來，台灣選民將迎來抉擇時刻：首先是今年11月舉行的地方與區域選舉（即台灣的「期中選舉」），接著是2028年的總統與立法機構選舉。當然，選舉結果難以預料，即便是即將到來的11月選舉也不例外。令人感到寬慰的是，在兩千三百多萬台灣民眾中，絕大多數人希望維持現狀及台灣事實上的獨立地位。然而，民調未能揭示的是台灣民眾為此願意付出多大代價。這點至關重要，尤其是在中國大陸的強硬姿態日益滲透進日常生活、且人們對美國履行安全承諾的信心正逐漸動搖之際。根據今年在台灣進行的一項調查，僅有34%的受訪者認為美國是一個「值得信賴的國家」。
第三站，也是最後一站：中國與習近平的「鏡子」
當台灣駐美最高外交代表俞大㵢（Yu Tah-lei）在2024年接受彭博電視採訪、被問及中國攻台的可能性有多迫切時，他的回答是：「我們必須確保，習近平每天早上醒來照鏡子時，都會對自己說：『不是今天』。」我認為，在未來一段時間內——至少在2028年台灣大選之前——『不是今天』。」我認為，在未來一段時間內——至少在2028年台灣大選之前——「不是今天」。畢竟，只要他認為存在不切實際程度尚可接受的機會能不戰而達成目標，他又何必發動一場風險極高的戰爭呢？
這一契機涉及兩個名字：唐納德·特朗普（Donald Trump）和鄭麗文（Cheng Li-wen）。簡而言之，在川普暫緩批准對台軍售這一初步讓步之後，習近平將向他及其繼任者施壓，要求做出進一步讓步——例如明確支持北京關於「台灣是中國一部分」的立場。此類舉動不僅會加深外界對美國可靠性的質疑，更會削弱台灣的防衛決心，而這正是北京所希望看到的。
國民黨籍的鄭麗文則比較符合習近平的算盤。首先，她開啟了重啟對話的途徑，而北京定會藉此施壓，要求在「統一」政治談判方面採取具體步驟，甚至制定時間表。同時，她也是中國全力引導台灣輿論邁向有利於己方發展的極佳棋子。總之，台灣面臨嚴峻挑戰與關鍵抉擇，將考驗其韌性以及選民的理性判斷。重蹈香港「一國兩制」模式的覆轍絕非良策；更令人振奮的做法，是銘記並堅持台灣2014年「太陽花學運」所取得的成果——當時，抗議者透過佔領立法院，迫使馬英九政府撤回了一項會導致台灣經濟被「出賣」給中國大陸的兩岸協議。
最後，鑑於今天這場活動是在萊比錫舉行的，引用劉曉波的話來結束發言本應最為恰當。但我——抱歉——選擇了另一個人：毛澤東。他曾說：「天下大亂才能大治」（只有天下大亂，才能建立強而有力的新秩序）。至於未來的走向究竟如何，就留給大家去推測和思考了。
Leipzig Conference 07/13/2026
Is Taiwan Still to be Saved? – The Decline of U.S. Power and the Democratic Island`s Future
Jürgen Kahl/ 康友耿
The question I´ve put on top of my contribution – Is Taiwan still to be saved? – is not a new one. It actually is overshadowing the history of the Republic of China (ROC) since it was transferred to the island. Particularly painful when the island republic in 1971 lost its seat in the UN and was replaced by the PRC. What followed was the successive de-recognition of the ROC in favor of the communist-ruled PRC, culminating in 1979, when the US, Taiwan`s staunchest ally, formally switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing and one year later scrapped the mutual defense treaty concluded in 1954.
The crisis Taiwan is facing right now in midst the ongoing geopolitical shifts gives the question if Taiwan is still to be saved and for how much longer an urgency that hardly could be overstated. What I mean is the dynamic and possibly fateful interplay of two factors. One is the growing uncertainty, whether and to what extent the current US administration and the following ones will be willing and in a position to stick to their commitments for the support and defense of Taiwan. And the second one is the public mood in Taiwan and in what direction the palpable sense of insecurity will drive the highly polarized domestic politics on the island and how that will shape the voters` preferences in the forthcoming elections, most important the presidential and parliamentary elections taking place in 2028: Choosing between a solid and convincing resolve to resist the relentless pressure and intimidation by which Beijing is trying to get Taiwan to its knees or falling into the appeasement-trap propagated by the new KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wen?
What is to be said about the shifting power dynamics in the triangle Beijing – Taipei – Washington and what does it mean for the future of the democratic hightech power Taiwan? Just a brief assessment, beginning with the US:
For effectively protecting a country against foreign aggression two things are needed: A strong political will and the capability or power to follow up on it. The bipartisan political will that has guided the US`s Taiwan policy after the abrogation of the bilateral defense treaty was based on two major decisions – (1) The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) passed as a binding law by Congress in 1979 and (2) The Six Assurances proclaimed in 1982. Altogether a pretty strong commitment, even with the TRA provision leaving it open if US forces in case of a war would directly get involved into the defense of Taiwan or not (strategic ambiguity).
Donald Trump has become the first president who most recently has watered down those long standing commitments by treating Taiwan as a kind of trade-off issue between Beijing and Washington. I just mention two of the most irritating “highlights” of his meeting with Xi Jinping:
1. One of the Six Assurances states: “The United States has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan”. According to what Trump after the summit told the press he actually discussed this matter “in great detail” with Xi, followed by his decision to indefinitely withhold final approval of the negotiated arms-deal with Taiwan worth about 14 Billion $.
2. The other instance Trump cozied up to Xi was his warning addressed to Taiwan`s president Lai Ching-te not to declare the island state independent. A message coming close to blame Lai and his DPP for the escalating crisis in and around the Taiwan Strait.
On top of this Trump in an interview made the following statement: ”I`m not looking to have somebody go independent and, you know, we`re supposed to travel 9.500 miles to fight a war”.
But even with a strong political will to fight a war provoked by China, the outcome would be all but certain and in any case extremely costly. When the PLA in the Taiwan crisis of 1995/96 threatened the island by conducting a series of missile tests in its vicinity, the US demonstrated her superiority by sending two aircraft carrier groups to the Taiwan Strait. 30 years later, when the military balance between China and the US in the Western Pacific and beyond is tilting towards parity, the aircraft carriers possibly wouldn`t even make it there.
In a recently published piece, the Economist comes to the qualified conclusion that America economically, militarily and technologically is still the most powerful player in the world, but “its dominance appears to be eroding”. That is also true for its rapidly shrinking diplomatic reach and influence. What makes that obvious in the case of Taiwan is the growing number of countries in the Global South switching to Beijing`s claims, code named One China Principle. According to independent counts taken early 2025, about 70 countries at that time had already endorsed China`s sovereignty over Taiwan as well as the PRC government`s entitlement to pursue all efforts to achieve unification, without specifying that those efforts should be peaceful.
Next stop Taiwan – A country deeply divided
In summer last year Taiwan`s president Lai Ching-te, since 2024 the DPP`s second head of state in a row, toured the island to deliver his Ten Talks on Uniting the Country. The intention of the exercise was to mobilize public support of his central policy guidelines: the uncompromising rebuttal of Beijing`s sovereignty claim, safeguarding democracy and social cohesion and strengthening Taiwan`s security by a significant upgrade in defense modernization. Being confronted by an existential threat with the island`s self-determination, the survival of its political system and way of life at stake, one duly could expect that the main messages Lai has transported were based on a joint platform or even national consensus shared by the opposition parties as well. Just the opposite is the case. Rather than closing ranks both sides are engaged in potentially self-destructive power plays around two main points of contention. One is the institutional set-up with the KMT, the main opposition party, and its much smaller partner, the TPP, trying to curtail the prerogatives of the executive branch in favor of the parliament, the Legislative Yuan, in which both parties are commanding a majority of just nine seats. Still sufficient to consistently block or dilute the government`s budget plans, in particular expenditures for critical defense projects.
Even more damaging for public trust and quite irritating to Taiwan`s foreign friends and partners is the disunity in how to deal with China, exacerbated since Cheng Li-wen is chairing the KMT. Her handshake with Xi Jinping in Beijing in April this year was prominently choreographed as a meeting of minds for the sake of constructive dialogue, goodwill and stability – in brief everything what the Chinese use to call a win-win-situation. If you want to know more about what Cheng Li-wen has in mind, I recommend you to read her guest piece in Foreign Affairs published in early March this year, subtitled “Cross-Strait Peace Requires Working with both Beijing and Washington”. In my view it is an exercise in wishful thinking, f.e. by assuming that it would satisfy Beijing if Taiwan just goes back to the formula on which the (failed) reconciliation attempt that president Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) was based – the so called 1992 consensus, acknowledging that there is only one China but taking note of the fact that each side has its own understanding of what that actually means.
In a not too distant future it will be Taiwan`s voters` turn to make up their mind. First in November when the local and regional elections – Taiwan´s midterms – take place and in the presidential and parliamentary elections following in 2028. The outcome is impossible to predict, of course, even for the November elections. The fact that the overwhelming majority of the 23 plus million Taiwanese wants to keep the status quo and Taiwan`s de-facto independence is reassuring. But what the opinion polls don`t tell us is the price Taiwanese people are ready to pay for it. And that is what counts, in particular in a situation when China`s aggressiveness is going to be felt in everyday`s life and the confidence that the US will honor its safety pledge is crumbling. According to a survey taken in Taiwan this year, only 34 % of the respondents agreed that the US “is a credible country”.
Third and final stop China and Xi Jinping`s Mirror
When Taiwan`s diplomatic No. 1 in the US, Yu Tah-lei, in a 2024 interview with Bloomberg TV was asked how imminent a Chinese attack on Taiwan might be, his answer was: “We have to make sure that every day when Xi Jinping wakes up and looks into the mirror he will say `Not today`”. It`s not only my guess that Xi will say just this – Not today – for some time to come, at least up to Taiwan`s election 2028. Because why should he start an extremely risky war as long as he sees a not too unrealistic chance for achieving his goals without fighting.
This chance has two names: Donald Trump and Cheng Li-wen. Just briefly. After the initial concession Trump has made by withholding his approval of the arms deal with Taiwan Xi will press him and his successors for further ones like explicitly endorsing Beijing`s view that Taiwan is a part of China. Any action of this kind would sow further doubts about the US`s reliability and, what Beijing is hoping for, undermine Taiwan`s resolve to defend itself.
The KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wen fits even better into Xi´s calculations. First by opening a pathway for a renewed dialogue Beijing definitely would use to press for concrete steps toward political negotiations on unification, and perhaps even a timetable. At the same time she is a most welcome tool for China`s all-out efforts to shape public opinion in Taiwan to its favor.
Altogether tough challenges and crucial choices lying ahead to test the resilience of Taiwan and the sober mindedness of its voters. Repeating the experience Hong Kong has made with the One country two systems recipe is not a good option. More encouraging would be to remember and keep in mind what Taiwan`s Sunflower Movement in 2014 had achieved. By occupying the parliament building they forced the Ma Ying-jeou government to withdraw a cross – strait agreement that would have sealed the economic sell-out of Taiwan to China.
Wrapping up: In connection with the event taking place here in Leipzig today, it would be most appropriate to conclude my remarks by quoting Liu Xiaobo. But I`ve – sorry for that – opted for someone else – Mao Zedong. He used to say “天下大乱才能大治” (Only when there is complete chaos under heaven, a strong new order can arise). I`m leaving it to you to speculate and think about in what direction the journey might go.
