編者按：這份由Freedom House主導、作者 Sarah Cook執筆發表的研究報告，對中共在國內和國際媒體的滲透和公然的騷擾和恐嚇，有詳盡的描述。其資料性詳實可信，是一份珍貴的資料。由於全文較長，本刊將陸續分段轉載。這是第二部分。
「讀者在哪裏，受眾在哪裏，宣傳報道的觸角就要伸向哪裏。」－習近平，2016
「這可能是微妙的，其中一些技倆是為了讓你對他們（與中國有關的參與者）不太強硬。至於停止，他們是不能阻止我寫作的。」
— 一名希望保持匿名的加納記者, 2021
中國政府在習近平的領導下正加速展開一場大規模的工程，以影響世界各地的媒體機構和新聞消費者。雖然他們在某方面使用傳統的外交工具來達到目的，但更多是利用隱蔽的、帶威脅性的，甚至乎是腐敗的方式。 近年越來越多國家都能表現出相當大的抵禦力，但北京的策略同時也變得更複雜、更具侵略性，而且更難被發現。
該政權的投資已達到部分成果 ─ 建立新的途徑使中國媒體的內容能接觸到廣大受眾、鼓勵不利中國共產黨（中共）的報導進行自我審查，並與一些國家的政府官員和媒體持有者合作，協助宣傳中國的論述或打壓批判性報導。北京的行動也有些長期影響，特別是當它在多數情況下獲得資訊建設重點部分的控制權。這些發展在未來可能產生的影響都不應被低估。
此外，台灣、美國、英國和澳洲的例子顯示，由於較溫和的影響力工程未能達到預期效果，所以它們最近轉向更進激的、更具對抗成份的或較為鬼祟的策略。 這趨勢預期會在未來幾年擴展到更多國家。更多國家及其研究人員、記者和政策制定者預期會通到更多外交恐嚇、網絡欺凌、受僱的網絡紅人在社交媒體上的操縱、以及旨在對中共和它們社會造成混亂的針對性虛假信息活動。中國政權及其代理人已表明，他們毫無疑慮以經濟壓力來消除和打壓不利的報導。隨着越來越多政府和媒體持有者面臨財政困難，來自北京隱藏的或明確的經濟壓力該會越來越多。這些壓力不僅會用於關於中國國內或地緣政治問題，也會用於中國與他國家的雙邊關係的議題上。
面對中共的影響力工程，民主國家並非是束手無策的。 許多國家記者和公民組織在確保多元報導、揭發脅迫行為和虛假信息工程以及教育新一代媒體工作者提高其警覺性和抵禦能力方面均有出色的表現。 與此同時，一些民主政府正在推行一些措施以提高透明度、改善相關機構之間的協調、懲罪外國官員的脅迫行為、並在與中國的貿易和投資增加的情況下剌激就有關保障措施的公開討論。相關措施有助解決北京的干涉行為，同時加強民主機構和獨立媒體對抗其他國內和海外威脅的能力。 此舉有可能涉及重大的政治意志，以及扭轉許多國家當地的媒體自由最近所面對的壓力。但若容許中共的威權媒體影響力工程不斷擴長，這將會付上言論自由、獲得有關中國未經審查的信息以及整個民主政府的代價。
自由之家在這份報告中調查了北京在30個國家裡的媒體影響力工程。這30個國家在2019－21年間被《世界自由度報告》評定為自由或部分自由。 而在這個組別中，有18個國家面臨已擴展的媒體影響力。中共影響力在這30個國家中的16個國家被認為是高或非常高，而 10個國家則是達到值得關注的水平，只有其餘4個國家被評為低。同時，調查的30個國家至少有一次由政策制定者、新聞機構、公民團體或社交媒體用戶主動反擊的事件，以減少北京活動的影響。 事實上，根據現有的數據，大多數國家對中國或中國政府的民意自2018年起都有所下降。 是項研究的其中一個關鍵調查結果是，中共增加的投資只得到相對有限的回報，並且有可能引發更多活躍的民主應對措施。
然而，如果考慮到媒體影響策略、應對能力及包括打壓獨立媒體及保護新聞自由的法律保障等當地責任，許多國家的復原力似乎更為脆弱。 自由之家使用新的研究方法調查30個國家，當中只有一半國家在面對北京的媒體影響是有抵禦能力的，其餘一半則被視為脆弱。即使現時中共很多的運動都已陷入困境，但是是項分析能嚴重警告相關的自滿風險。
這份報告是至今就北京的全球媒體影響力及民主國家應對方式的最全面評估。報告參考了媒體調查、訪問、學術出版物、中國政府資料以及當地分析人員的實地研究 ，覆蓋了從2019年1月至2021年12月期間，30個國家的發展情況。 這份報告更新及擴展了自由之家在2013年1 及 20202 出版的兩份研究報告， 主要關注一個相對受紥實的媒體自由制度保護的民主國家，在面對影響力工程時的反應和部署，以便提供一個更深入的理解。 報告最後向政府、媒體部門、技術公司和公民團體提供加強民主防禦應對中共干預的建議。
Authoritarian Expansion and the Power of Democratic Resilience
“Wherever the readers are, wherever the viewers are, that is where propaganda reports must extend their tentacles.” —Xi Jinping, 2016
“It may be subtle, some of these tricks are geared toward coaxing you to be soft on them [Chinese state-affiliated actors]. As for stopping, they can’t stop me from writing.” —Ghanaian journalist who wished to remain anonymous, 2021
The Chinese government, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, is accelerating a massive campaign to influence media outlets and news consumers around the world. While some aspects of this effort use the tools of traditional public diplomacy, many others are covert, coercive, and potentially corrupt. A growing number of countries have demonstrated considerable resistance in recent years, but Beijing’s tactics are simultaneously becoming more sophisticated, more aggressive, and harder to detect.
The regime’s investment has already achieved some results, establishing new routes through which Chinese state media content can reach vast audiences, incentivizing self-censorship on topics disfavored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and co-opting government officials and media owners in some countries to assist in spreading propaganda narratives or suppressing critical coverage. Beijing’s actions also have long-term implications, particularly as it gains leverage over key portions of the information infrastructure in many settings. The possible future impact of these developments should not be underestimated.
Moreover, the experience of countries including Taiwan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia point toward a recent turn to more aggressive, confrontational, or surreptitious tactics as milder influence efforts fail to achieve the desired results. This trend is likely to expand to additional countries in the coming years. More countries—and their researchers, journalists, and policymakers—should expect to encounter a rise in diplomatic intimidation, cyberbullying, manipulation by hired influencers on social media, and targeted disinformation campaigns designed to sow confusion about the CCP and their own societies. The Chinese regime and its proxies have shown that they have no qualms about deploying economic pressure to neutralize and suppress unfavorable coverage. As more governments and media owners face financial trouble, the likelihood increases that economic pressure from Beijing will be used, implicitly or explicitly, to reduce critical debate and reporting—not only on China’s domestic or geopolitical concerns, but also on its bilateral engagement with other countries.
Democracies are far from helpless in the face of the CCP’s influence efforts. In many countries, journalists and civil society groups have led the way by ensuring diversity of coverage, exposing coercive behavior and disinformation campaigns, and instilling both vigilance and resilience in a new generation of media workers, researchers, and news consumers. Meanwhile, some democratic governments are pursuing initiatives to increase transparency, improve coordination among relevant agencies, punish coercive actions by foreign officials, and spur public debate about the need for safeguards amid increased trade and investment with China. These measures will address Beijing’s encroachments while strengthening democratic institutions and independent media against other domestic and international threats. Such steps may require considerable political will—and a reversal of recent domestic pressure on media freedom in many countries. But allowing the CCP’s authoritarian media influence campaign to expand unchecked would carry its own costs for freedom of expression, access to uncensored information about China, and democratic governance in general.
For this report, Freedom House examined Beijing’s media influence efforts across 30 countries, all of which were rated Free or Partly Free in Freedom in the World during the 2019–21 coverage period. Of this group, 18 countries encountered expanded media influence efforts. In 16 of the 30, the intensity of CCP influence efforts was found to be High or Very High, while 10 countries faced a Notable level and only 4 countries faced a Low level. At the same time, all 30 countries demonstrated at least one incident of active pushback by policymakers, news outlets, civic groups, or social media users that reduced the impact of Beijing’s activities. Indeed, based on available data, public opinion toward China or the Chinese government has declined in most of the countries since 2018. This dynamic of greatly increased CCP investment offering comparatively modest returns—and even triggering a more active democratic response—is one of the key findings that emerged from the study.
Nevertheless, when the full constellation of media influence tactics, response efforts, and domestic liabilities—including crackdowns on independent media and gaps in legal protections for press freedom—are taken into account, the resilience of many target countries appears more fragile. Among the 30 countries assessed using Freedom House’s new methodology, only half were found to be resilient in the face of Beijing’s media influence, and the other half were found to be vulnerable. This breakdown offers a stark warning as to the risk of complacency, even if many of the CCP’s existing campaigns have floundered.
This report offers the most comprehensive assessment to date of Beijing’s global media influence and the ways in which democracies are responding. Drawing on media investigations, interviews, scholarly publications, Chinese government sources, and on-the-ground research by local analysts, it covers developments in 30 countries during the period from January 2019 to December 2021. It updates and expands upon two previous Freedom House studies published in 20131 and 2020,2 and it focuses largely on democracies to provide a more in-depth understanding of the deployment and reception of influence tactics in countries that possess relatively strong institutional protections for media freedom. Finally, the report offers recommendations to governments, the media sector, technology firms, and civil society groups on how they can bolster democratic defenses against CCP interference.
中英文原文請見：https://freedomhouse.org/report/beijing-global-media-influence/2022/authoritarian-expansion-power-democratic-resilience
