The Taiwan visit of Nancy Pelosi in early August 2022 has been a tipping point in China—Taiwan—US relations—a tipping point for the worse, as we all know. Since then, the topic most hotly discussed or rather speculated on in military and political circles and in the media has been the question of not if but when China would start a full-blown attack on Taiwan.
Much less attention was given to the less costly and less risky option China – at least for the time – being has chosen. Rather than attacking the island in the same way as Putin has done in Ukraine, it has stepped up its attempts to bring Taiwan to its heels by military intimidation, economic pressure (about 1/3rd of Taiwan`s worldwide exports are still directed to China and HK), international isolation and destabilizing it from within. This option, which we see in action right now, is – among others – less risky because it makes it more difficult for Taiwan`s partners and supportive friends in Asia and the West to decide at what point blunt harassment turns into outright violence. In my view, that is a purely academic debate. Even without firing a shot (preferably leaving that to the armed forces in Taiwan), China is already leading a war against the island – not yet in the classical sense but, in a broader understanding of war, no less violent.
Trying to choke Taiwan and finally to subjugate the island is not a new Chinese approach. Under the guidance of Xi Jinping, it`s the order of the day since Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016. But following the election of her successor Lai Ching-teh (seen by Beijing as an even more dyed-in-the-wool separatist), the so-called new normal in cross-strait relations has reached a level that puts Taiwan in a permanent state of emergency, unsustainable in the longer run. The Taipei Times, in a recent commentary, has called it “China`s anaconda strategy.”
Just take the latest round of military exercises – the 2nd big one this year – called “Sword 2024B” and staged by the PLA all around Taiwan. It was a massive show of force unseen before Because of the sheer number of warplanes (153) involved, the coordinated operations by PLA`s airforce, navy, and rocket forces, and – for the first time – support by the Chinese coast guard. All intended to send a message in two directions: Telling the Taiwanese that resistance would be suicidal and the Americans that the PLA would be capable of cutting the island off from supplies coming from the US or its Asian allies.
What does that mean for the future of the island republic and the prospects that the 24 million Taiwanese will succeed in defending their de-facto independence, their way of life, and their democratic system?
Seen from the global perspective, the political support for Taiwan has been diminished further – despite and in striking contrast to the island`s global economic importance as a leading high-tech hub. In particular in the so-called Global South, due to China`s economic and political power plays in Africa and Latin America and its leading role in organizations such as BRICS.
How this works against Taiwan`s legitimate interests, is regularly to be seen in the United Nations. Demonstrated by the fact that the repeated attempts by Washington, the EU and other countries aimed at getting some kind of active participation for Taiwan in UN agencies like WHA have all been successfully out-maneuvered and blocked by Beijing and its supporting coalition.
Wherever right now the future of Taiwan is discussed, in the first place on the island itself, the big elephant or question mark in the room is the outcome of the presidential elections in the US – in fact, albeit not in name, Taiwan`s staunchest and most important. The outgoing president J. Biden has repeatedly and in public (actually 4 x) stressed that American troops would not stand idly by in case Taiwan was attacked by China. If Kamala Harris, if elected, will follow-up on that with like-minded promises remains to be seen, but seems doubtful to me.
Donald Trump definitely will not. Blaiming Taiwan for having “stolen” the US`s semiconductor industry, Trump wants the island republic in the first place to spend much more itself on its defence (suggesting up to 10 % of GDP) and rather than receiving continued military aid from the US (900 Mio. $ since 2022) it should pay for the military hardware it needs. Fully in line with his businesslike trade-off approach, he didn`t forget to mention, that Taiwan last year has earned a surplus of roughly 50 Bill. $ in its trade with the US.
To answer the question, of whether the EU and Germany are up to the aggressive challenge posed by China vis a vis Taiwan, I`ll leave to the seasoned expert here with his much deeper insight – Ambassador Shieh.
In my final remarks, I`ll briefly explain what in my view needs to be done to cope with the challenge – not to solve the conflict (that would be unrealistic), but to contain it. Keeping in mind, that China`s aggression is not only directed against Taiwan but it is part of its hegemonic ambitions that extend from the East China Sea into the Pacific, the South China Sea, and into the adjacent parts of the Indian Ocean.
My first point is – addressed to Taiwan`s political parties and decision-makers:
The continued polarization and disunity, in particular between the KMT and the ruling DP, how to deal with Beijing is self-destructive. In such a critical moment, where Taiwan`s survival is at stake, the major parties should, in the best interest of the island state, close ranks and form a coalition of national unity. That would not be a game changer in the conflict with China. But it would send a strong signal to the rest of the world and possibly mobilize stronger support for Taiwan in the West and beyond.
Secondly: The narrow definition of violence on which the countless Western warnings and appeals against China subjugating Taiwan by force are based, is inadequate. That should be a lesson learned by the way the Russian war against Ukraine has begun. Even without the first shot having been fired, China has already started its war against the island republic and in the end it doesn`t matter if the “enemy” has been shot or suffocated.
And finally: Even the strongest warnings are toothless as long as they are not accompanied by letting the other side know in clear-cut terms what reaction he has to expect if he is crossing the red line. This is called credible deterrence. China is very experienced in drawing red lines. We are not. That`s a weakness. The case of Ukraine has dramatically shown how this backfires.
台灣還有未來嗎？不確定的盟友和國內的衝突
2022 年 8 月，南希‧佩洛西 (Nancy Pelosi) 訪台，成為中台美關係的轉捩點。軍政界和媒體最熱議的話題不是中國是否會全面進攻台灣，而是中國何時全面進攻台灣。
中國嘗試透過軍事恐嚇、經濟壓力來迫使台灣屈服。事實上，即使沒有開一槍，中國也已經在領導一場針對台灣的戰爭，其暴力程度絲毫不減真正的熱戰。
賴清德總統上任後，兩岸關係的「新常態」讓台灣陷入永久緊急狀態的程度，《台灣時報》最近發表評論稱其為「中國的蟒蛇戰略」。
以解放軍在台海舉行的「利劍2024B」是一次前所未見的大規模武力展示：由於參與的戰機數量龐大（153架），解放軍空軍、海軍和火箭軍協同作戰，中國海警也配合支持。所有這些都旨在向兩個方向傳遞訊息：告訴台灣人，抵抗將是自殺；告訴美國人，解放軍將有能力切斷島嶼與美國或其亞洲盟友的供應。
中國在非洲和拉丁美洲發揮的經濟和政治力量，及其在金磚國家等組織中的主導地位，使得世界對台灣的政治支持進一步減少——儘管台灣作為高科技中心，對全球經濟具有絕對的重要性。華盛頓、歐盟和其他國家一再試圖讓台灣以某種方式積極參與世界衛生大會等國際機構，都被北京及其支持者成功阻撓。
拜登總統曾四次公開強調，如果台灣遭到中國的攻擊，美國軍隊不會袖手旁觀。卡馬拉·哈里斯如果當選，是否會做出同樣承諾，這一點還有待觀察。至於特朗普，他絕對不會支持台灣，他指責台灣「竊取」了美國的半導體產業，並要求台灣在國防上投入GDP 的 10%。
中國的侵略不僅針對台灣，其霸權野心從東海延伸到太平洋、南海和印度洋鄰近地區。
我有幾點建議：
1。國民黨和執政的民進黨之間，不能繼續分化和爭吵，面對北京，這樣島上的互鬥是自我毀滅性的。在台灣存亡的關鍵時刻，各大黨派應該從島國的最大利益出發，緊密團結，結成聯盟。這才能向世界發出強烈信號，可能動員西方及其他地區對台灣更強有力的支持。
2。其次，西方僅僅對中國對台的「侵犯」表現「警惕」是不夠的。俄烏戰爭就是教訓。即使第一槍還沒有打響，中國就已經開始了對台灣的「戰爭」。
3。 西方應當明瞭什麼是「可信威懾」。中國很會「劃定紅線」，但若沒有說明，對方若跨過「紅線」，它會如何反應，那麼這種威懾只是紙老虎，不足為懼。
（歐洲之聲翻譯，略有縮減）
