總統賴清德的言論增加了與中國開戰的風險
作者：卡內基國際和平基金會高級研究員克里斯托弗-奇夫維斯（Christopher S. Chivvis）和卡內基國際和平基金會美國國策項目高級研究員斯蒂芬-韋特海姆（Stephen Wertheim）
美國總統喬治-W-布什（George W. Bush）從不以在世界舞台上的克制而聞名，但當台灣總統陳水扁在 2002 年試圖推動台灣島走向獨立時，布什派出了他的外交官來遏制美國的民主夥伴。布什總統當時明確告訴中國和全世界，美國反對陳水扁的計劃，因為這將激怒北京，助長局勢升級，增加戰爭風險，並可能招致美國的介入。
如今，台灣有了另一位強硬的總統賴清德。今年 3 月，賴清德史無前例地將中國定為 “外國敵對勢力”，並公布了 17 項 “積極措施 ”來打擊中國對台灣的滲透。北京隨後舉行了大規模軍事演習，模擬對台灣港口和基礎設施的封鎖和打擊。
華盛頓理所當然地譴責了中國的軍事升級，但迄今為止卻忽視了賴清德更微妙的政治升級。特朗普政府應該在賴清德誤認為華盛頓的被動態度是對他的認可，並將美國卷入一場可能帶來災難的戰爭之前對他加以控制。
引用賴清德在就職演說中的話，自去年 5 月上任以來，他不斷采取新的措施來保護和維護台灣作為 “主權、獨立國家 ”的地位。他的許多行動，如將台灣的國防開支提高到占 GDP 3% 的目標，以及實施民防培訓計劃，都是值得歡迎的，也是早該采取的。這些措施改善了台灣島內的防御，加強了兩岸的威懾力。然而，可以預見的是，他的其他舉動卻與北京針鋒相對，毫無益處。
在將中國視為外國敵對勢力之前，賴清德發表了幾次演講，在將台灣定位為獨立於中國的主權國家方面比其前任走得更遠。賴清德並沒有提議台灣正式宣布獨立，因為此舉會越過北京最明確的紅線，也不會得到台灣民眾的支持。然而，他所采取的是典型的 “薩拉米切片 ”策略，這在很大程度上不為世界各地的觀察家所注意，除了那些最重要的觀察家：海峽對岸相互瞪視的雙方。
賴清德的行動可能會提高他在國內的支持率，但卻增加了一場誰都不希望發生的戰爭的風險。據美國情報機構稱，中國國家主席習近平已要求他的軍隊在 2027 年之前具備奪取台灣的能力，但不一定會下達這樣的命令。然而，賴清德的舉動使台灣更接近獨立，大大增加了習近平要犯台的風險。習近平可能會奪取台灣離島，下令封鎖，甚至入侵，理由是如果他現在不采取行動，中國就會錯失將台灣永遠置於其統治之下的機會。
有人會反對說，中國脅迫台灣是咎由自取，如果也對台灣施壓，那就有悖常理了。但是，除非雙方都想辦法趴下來，否則兩岸關係危險升級的軌跡是沒有出路的。加強台灣防衛能力的必要性應該突出而不是削弱避免通過言辭挑釁北京的必要性。賴清德的看法顯然不同，只有美國有影響力讓他改弦更張。
不幸的是，華盛頓至今仍允許賴清德在其雷達之下飛行。美國總統唐納德-特朗普（Donald Trump）尚未關注台灣問題，他的政府鼓勵賴清德加強防務。因此，賴清德可以被原諒地認為，在他引導台灣走向更大獨立的過程中，美國是他的後盾。但這一結論還為時過早。台北不應高估美國在任何總統領導下都會為其防務所做的努力。民意調查顯示，只有不到三分之一的美國人贊成為台灣開戰。台灣在做決定時必須擦亮眼睛，不要以為美國會代台灣打第三次世界大戰。
為了傳遞正確的信息，特朗普不必重覆他在橢圓形辦公室與烏克蘭總統沃洛德梅爾-澤連斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）爭吵時的醜態。相反，他可以簡單地說，美國希望中國和台灣恢復2016年之前的兩岸對話。要實現這一目標，台北很可能需要回到其長期以來的立場，即仍然存在某種 “一個中國”。這是一個有用的虛構，北京應該表示歡迎，但台灣卻只能空口無憑。要想讓賴清德朝這個方向前進，特朗普可能需要向他明確表示，華盛頓反對台灣任何越來越接近獨立的舉動。考慮到美國在戰爭中可能付出的代價，這將是一個合理的要求。
特朗普與習近平會晤時，兩國領導人還可以討論就台灣問題公開交換保證。例如，美國可以申明，它將接受任何和平解決兩岸分歧的方案，除非得到雙方同意，否則在任何情況下都不會支持台灣獨立。作為回報，中國可以宣布它沒有奪取台灣的時間表，並撤回針對台灣島的軍事姿態和灰色地帶行動，這將極大地緩解台灣人民的壓力。這樣的保證將起到約束賴清德的作用，而且即使中國政府不履行承諾，對台灣防務至關重要的該地區國家也會看到，如果事態進一步升級，中國將承擔全部責任。
華盛頓的許多人會譴責向美國的合作夥伴施壓和與美國的對手討價還價的想法。但形勢要求我們采取行動。特朗普應該明確表示，賴清德必須停止在台灣獨立問題上推波助瀾，以保持美國的強大支持。如果布什可以為了維護和平而采取有分寸的政策，特朗普也可以。另一種選擇是眼睜睜地看著現狀繼續惡化，甚至可能到了無法挽回的地步。
轉載自https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/01/trump-taiwan-china-war-military/（Deepl機器翻譯）
Trump Should Rein In Taiwan
President Lai Ching-te’s rhetoric increases the risk of war with China.
By Christopher S. Chivvis, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
U.S. President George W. Bush will never be known for his restraint on the world stage, but when Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian sought to move the island closer toward independence in 2002, Bush sent his diplomats to rein in America’s democratic partner. The president then flatly told China, and the world, that the United States opposed Chen’s plans, which would provoke Beijing, fuel escalation, and increase the risk of a war that could draw in the United States.
Today, Taiwan has another hard-charging president, Lai Ching-te. In March, Lai designated China as a “foreign hostile force,” an unprecedented step, and unveiled 17 “proactive measures” to combat Chinese infiltration on the island. Beijing followed up with large military drills simulating a blockade and strikes against Taiwan’s ports and infrastructure.
Washington has rightly denounced China’s military escalations, but it has so far overlooked Lai’s subtler political escalations. The Trump administration should rein in Lai before he mistakes Washington’s passivity for approval and entangles the United States in a potentially calamitous war.
Since Lai took office last May, he has continually taken new steps to protect and assert Taiwan’s status as a “sovereign, independent nation,” to quote his inaugural address. Many of his actions, such as boosting Taiwan’s defense spending to target 3 percent of GDP and implementing civil-defense training programs, are welcome and indeed overdue. These measures improve the island’s defenses and strengthen cross-strait deterrence. Yet his other moves have predictably antagonized Beijing for no benefit.
Before deeming China a foreign hostile force, Lai gave several speeches that went significantly further than his predecessors in positioning Taiwan as a sovereign state that is separate from China. Lai is not proposing that Taiwan formally declare itself independent, a move that would cross Beijing’s clearest red line and command little popular support among Taiwanese. He is, however, engaging in classic “salami-slicing” tactics that go largely unnoticed to observers around the world, except the ones that matter most: the parties staring each other down across the strait.
Lai’s actions may boost his domestic support, but they increase the risk of a war that nobody should want. According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese President Xi Jinping has told his military to become capable of seizing the island by 2027 but may not necessarily intend to order such an operation. By moving Taiwan closer toward independence, however, Lai’s moves are greatly increasing the risks that Xi will. Xi could seize Taiwan’s outlying islands, order a blockade, or even invade, reasoning that if he does not act now, China will miss the chance to bring Taiwan under its authority forever.
Some will object that because China bears blame for coercing Taiwan, it would be perverse to pressure the latter as well. But there is no plausible exit from the dangerous, escalatory trajectory of cross-strait relations unless both sides find ways to climb down. The need to strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities should accentuate, not diminish, the need to avoid poking Beijing through rhetoric. Lai clearly sees things differently, and only the United States has the leverage to make him change course.
Unfortunately, Washington has so far allowed Lai to fly under its radar. U.S. President Donald Trump has yet to focus on Taiwan, and his administration has encouraged Lai’s defense buildup. Lai could thus be forgiven for thinking that America has his back as he steers Taiwan toward greater independence. But this conclusion would be premature. Taipei should not overestimate what the United States, under any president, would do in its defense. Polls show that scarcely more than one-third of Americans would favor going to war for Taiwan. Taiwan must make decisions with clear eyes and not assume the United States will fight World War III on its behalf.
To deliver the right message, Trump need not repeat the ugliness of his Oval Office spat with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Instead, he can simply say the United States wants China and Taiwan to resume the cross-strait dialogue that existed prior to 2016. Getting there would likely require Taipei to return to its long-standing position that there still exists “one China” of some kind. This is a useful fiction that Beijing should welcome yet costs Taiwan nothing but words. To get Lai to move in this direction might require Trump to make clear to him that Washington opposes any moves by Taiwan to inch closer and closer to independence. Given the costs the United States could pay in the event of a war, this would be a reasonable request.
When Trump meets with Xi, the leaders could also discuss a public exchange of assurances over Taiwan. The United States could, for example, affirm that it would accept any peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences and would under no circumstances support Taiwan’s independence, except with the consent of both sides. In return, China could declare that it has no timeline for seizing Taiwan and pull back on its military posturing and gray-zone operations targeting the island, offering a great relief to the Taiwanese people. Such assurances would serve to restrain Lai, and even if Beijing did not live up to its commitments, countries in the region, which are crucial to Taiwan’s defense, would see that China bears sole responsibility for any further escalation.
Many in Washington will decry the idea of pressuring a U.S. partner and bargaining with a U.S. adversary. But the situation demands action. Trump should make clear that Lai must stop pushing the envelope on Taiwan’s independence in order to retain strong backing from the United States. If Bush could adopt a measured policy in the interest of preserving peace, so can Trump. The alternative is to watch the status quo continue to deteriorate, potentially to the point of no return.
Link：https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/01/trump-taiwan-china-war-military/
